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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Copyright law and its fundamental goals have long been consi-
dered a paradox in the United States. Essentially, our framework 
says that in order to promote growth and progress in the arts, the 
availability of creative works must be restricted from use by other 
creators.1 By treating creativity as property in this country, we have 
attempted to promote creation merely by assuring authors that their 
works will be afforded protections and rights from which only they 
can benefit.2 Many scholars have criticized this approach, arguing 
that creation cannot be treated like property and that the rigid 
boundaries of copyright law currently discourage, rather than foster, 
an overarching ideology of progress.3 This paradox left legal scholars 
                                                                                                                    
 *. J.D., Florida State University College of Law; Member of the Georgia Bar. Special 
thanks to Professor Amelia Rinehart for her insight and feedback on earlier drafts; to 
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Kathryn Isted for their help throughout the writing process. 
 1. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing the exclusive rights granted to a copy-
right holder). 
 3. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 4 (2001) (“Copyright law . . . is 
filled with rules that ordinary people would respond to by saying, ‘There can’t really be a 
law that says that. That would be silly.’ Yet in fact there is such a law, and it does say just 
that, and it is, as the ordinary person rightly thinks, silly.” (citation omitted)); Sèverine 
Dusollier, The Master’s Tools v. the Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 271-72 (2006) (“Creative Commons seeks to cure a symbolic fail-
ure of the present copyright regime. This failure is marked by the increasing perception of 
copyright as an impediment to the creative process or the enjoyment of cultural re-
sources . . . .”); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Order-
ing in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376-77 (2005) (“Public 
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and artists alike wondering, “Is there a better way?” Several years 
ago, this question was answered in the affirmative with the creation 
of the Creative Commons, a public licensing structure to be used in 
conjunction with current copyright laws.4
 The Creative Commons, a Massachusetts tax-exempt charitable 
corporation, has attempted to create a middle ground between tradi-
tional, rigid copyright protections and the public domain, which of-
fers the creator no protections once his works have been granted to 
the public.5 Instead, the Creative Commons has created a system of 
public licenses that allow the creator to retain his copyright while 
donating some of his exclusive rights to the public. This system has 
been described as the “some rights reserved” approach to copyright, 
where the creator chooses the rights that are most important to him 
or her to retain but releases others to the public.6 Granting some 
rights to the general public is thought to encourage sharing and the 
creation of new or derivative works from others, which will in turn 
spur additional growth within the commons.7 Since its birth, the 
Creative Commons has become an international phenomenon, estab-
lishing licensing systems in fifty-two countries, with eight more 
project jurisdictions currently in negotiations.8 And, Creative Com-
mons has stimulated several recent spin-offs, such as the Science 
                                                                                                                    
domain advocates . . . perceive the expanded copyright regime as a growing threat to aca-
demic freedom, free speech, and cultural autonomy, which will compromise efficiency and 
stifle innovation.”); Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative 
Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copy-
right, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 273 (2007) (“Individuals, increasingly in the possession 
of tools that easily facilitate the use and reuse of existing materials, cannot as easily 
shoulder the burdens on creativity that copyright creates.”). But see Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Creativity or Commons: A Comment on Professor Lessig, 55 FLA. L. REV. 795, 796 (2003) 
(“[L]ess copyright protection may mean less creative effort, not just by those with original 
ideas, but by those wishing to dip into the commons in order to produce derivative works. 
The outcome is that the commons might well be wide open but relatively infertile and un-
interesting.”). 
 4. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/ 
Frequently_Asked_Questions (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (“Applying a Creative Commons 
license to your work does not give you the same, similar or alternate protection to register-
ing your copyright. Creative Commons licenses apply in addition to and on top of an exist-
ing copyright.”). 
 5. See id. (“The idea underlying Creative Commons is that some people may not 
want to exercise all of the intellectual property rights the law affords them. We believe 
there is an unmet demand for an easy yet reliable way to tell the world ‘Some rights re-
served’ or even ‘No rights reserved.’ ”); Creative Commons History, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/History (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 6. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4. 
 7. Loren, supra note 3, at 273-74. 
 8. Creative Commons International, http://creativecommons.org/international (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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Commons and CCLearn, which are similar licensing regimes for the 
scientific and academic communities.9
 The Creative Commons is not, however, without its critics. Some 
argue that the extensive rules and legal codes associated with these 
licenses do not do anything to free creative types from the rigidity of 
traditional copyright boundaries.10 The most practical problem facing 
this new regime is that the Creative Commons licensing scheme does 
not include an enforcement mechanism.11 Since recovery of damages 
under copyright law requires a copyright holder to show that some-
one unlawfully infringed upon one of his or her statutorily granted 
rights,12 it remains unclear whether an artist using a Creative Com-
mons license could recover under copyright law. For the license 
terms that do represent statutory rights, infringement may still be 
difficult—if not impossible—to prove, since the works are available to 
the public at large.13 Arguably, those license terms representing 
rights that the Copyright Act does not include are not covered by 
current copyright law at all.14 On the other hand, it is not yet clear if 
a licensor will be able to enforce such terms through a suit for breach 
of contract for a licensee’s failure to comply with the terms of a Crea-
tive Commons license.15 While Creative Commons licensing has expe-
rienced a meteoric rise in popularity during its short life, its utility to 
further the goals of copyright law may be hindered if fear of in-
fringement without enforcement repels artists from using these li-
censes in the first place. If, however, the issue of enforcement can be 
clarified, artists can feel confident that they can contribute to the ar-
tistic and technological creative community while still retaining legal 
rights to enforce against abuses of the rights they have chosen to retain. 
                                                                                                                    
 9. See Science Commons » About Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org/about 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009); CCLearn, http://learn.creativecommons.org/about (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2009). Note that the Creative Commons does not advise that its licenses be used 
for software; instead, the Creative Commons still encourages software creators to utilize 
open source licensing, which is a similar licensing structure specifically for software and 
one of the inspirations for the creation of the Creative Commons. See Creative Commons 
FFAQ, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FFAQ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 10. Dusollier, supra note 3, at 284-85 (“The contractual rights [in the license] . . . . in-
crease[] the commodification of copyrighted works, as any copy of the work is governed by 
predetermined terms that apply to any use of the work. Yet, this is precisely that growing 
commodification of copyrighted works that Creative Commons seeks to fight.”); Elkin-
Koren, supra note 3, at 411 (“[T]he licensing strategy does not facilitate a simple fixed li-
cense. Seeking to reduce the high information costs associated with the copyright system, 
Creative Commons’ strategy offers to license works upfront. Yet, the variety of customized 
licenses is likely to increase costs.”). 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
 12. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 504 (2006). 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. These include the rights to Attribution and Share-Alike licensing. See infra notes 
119-21 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74. 
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 Part II of this Comment will explore the history of creative com-
mons licensing, the licenses offered, and how the licenses are being 
used globally. Part III will then examine the current state of Crea-
tive Commons enforcement and litigation, both in the United States 
and in the international community, and will discuss the growing 
concerns over the enforcement of these licenses.  
 In Part IV, this Comment will show that in order to allow the 
Creative Commons movement to grow and flourish, a proper remedy 
must be created for the average user. While there are several theo-
ries and options for enforcement, the author’s opinion is that when 
reading the license terms for enforcement purposes, each term of a 
Creative Commons license must be looked at individually. Under this 
interpretation, copyright claims may still be pursued for those license 
terms reserving statutorily exclusive rights, such as attribution and 
share-alike licensing, and those terms should be treated as contrac-
tual provisions. The author recommends the adoption of a judicial 
philosophy that allows licensors to receive equitable relief in the form 
of injunctions or specific performance, as well as the recovery of en-
forcement costs. This remedy is appropriate considering the typical 
users of the Creative Commons licensing system and their goals. Al-
ternatively, the Creative Commons (or another private entity) could 
establish an alternative dispute resolution network to resolve issues 
between licensors and users in this growing movement.  
 This Comment will then conclude in Part V that both of these pos-
sibilities, enforcing Creative Commons licenses as limited contracts 
(similar to shrink wrap licensing agreements) or establishing a net-
work of arbitration panels, can further the goals of artistic and scien-
tific progress while still allowing artists to retain a limited enforce-
ment right. 
II.   THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE CREATIVE COMMONS
 The Creative Commons was founded in 2001, with the aid of intel-
lectual property experts such as Lawrence Lessig16 and James Boyle17
and, from the time of its inception, was intended to serve as a happy 
medium between the rigid “all rights reserved” approach of tradi-
tional copyright protections and the abandonment of rights required 
                                                                                                                    
 16. Lawrence Lessig is a renowned author and professor at Stanford Law School in 
the field of intellectual property law; he is considered the father of the Creative Commons 
movement. Professor Lessig maintains a blog, mostly dedicated to Creative Commons is-
sues and sharing Creative Commons licensed work. See Lessig 2.0, Short Biography, 
http://www.lessig.org/info/bio (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 17. James Boyle is a professor of law at Duke University School of Law, where he fo-
cuses on public domain issues and is the current chairman of the board for the Creative 
Commons. See Duke Law Faculty, http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/boyle (last visited Nov.  
30, 2009). 
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by offering works into the public domain.18 To this end, the Creative 
Commons seeks to make a middle ground, where creators could allow 
the public to access their works, while still retaining certain rights, 
such as attribution and exclusive rights to create derivative works.19
The Creative Commons’ self-described mission statement is “to build 
a layer of reasonable, flexible copyright in the face of increasingly re-
strictive default rules.”20 Beyond creating a semicommons21 of crea-
tive works partially available in the public domain, the Creative 
Commons seeks to provide easily digestible information for the com-
mon user. To achieve this, the Creative Commons identifies the vari-
ous license restrictions with pictorial symbols and provides not only 
digital and legal codes, but also a “Commons Deed” that describes the 
terms of the license in easy-to-read language.22 Further, on its web-
site, the Creative Commons even makes available cartoon represen-
tations of the Creative Commons licensing process.23
 Creative Commons is not a substitute for copyright; instead of re-
placing copyright laws and protections, the Creative Commons li-
censes supplement and adjust the rights of the copyright holder.24
Though Creative Commons licenses are typically grouped together 
and referred to as a whole,25 there are several different types of li-
censes available.26 When choosing a Creative Commons license, the 
                                                                                                                    
 18. Creative Commons History, supra note 5. 
 19. Id. (“[The Creative Commons] work[s] to offer creators a best-of-both-worlds way 
to protect their works while encouraging certain uses of them—to declare ‘some rights re-
served.’ ”); see also Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/ 
licenses/meet-the-licenses (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (describing the license terms and 
what rights are surrendered and retained with each). 
 20. Creative Commons History, supra note 5. 
 21. The term “semicommons” describes a system where public rights and private 
rights in property are critically intermingled. Loren, supra note 3, at 274-75. Though the 
term typically applies to real property, Loren recently applied this concept to the intercon-
nection of the public domain and the retained rights of creators under the Creative Com-
mons licensing scheme. Id.
 22. Creative Commons Licenses, supra note 19. 
 23. Id. The Creative Commons prides itself on being user friendly, providing “free, 
easy-to-use legal and technical tools that give everyone a simple, standardized way to pre-
clear copyrights to their creative work.” Welcome to the Creative Commons Network, 
https://creativecommons.net (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). Comics to illustrate how the Crea-
tive Commons licensing and collaboration processes work are available at 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Comics. To view a sample Commons Deed for a work li-
censed under an Attribution Share-Alike license, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 24. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4. 
 25. See, e.g., Richard Stallman Critiques Creative Commons, http://www.chander.com/ 
2006/03/richard_stallma.html (Mar. 18, 2006, 07:08 AM). Richard Stallman, creator of the 
open source movement, has withheld support for the Creative Commons precisely because 
of this grouping mentality. Stallman stated: “It would be self-delusion to try to endorse just 
some of the Creative Commons licenses, because people lump them together; they will mis-
construe any endorsement of some as a blanket endorsement of all. I therefore find myself 
constrained to reject Creative Commons entirely.” Id.
 26. Creative Commons Licenses, supra note 19. 
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copyright holder is free to choose which rights to retain and which 
rights to grant the public.27 Following are brief descriptions and iden-
tifying symbols of the six main licenses that the Creative Commons 
offers, from least to most restrictive.28
Attribution: An artist who chooses this license allows others to 
distribute, remix, and create commercial or noncommercial deriva-
tive works from his or her work. In return, the artist seeks only to 
be given credit for his or her original creation in any subsequent 
distribution or derivative work.29
Attribution Share-Alike: An artist who chooses this license al-
lows others to distribute, remix, and create commercial or non-
commercial derivative works from his or her work. In return, the 
artist seeks not only to be given credit for his or her original crea-
tion, but also requires that the licensee license new creations under 
the same terms and license as the original work. Since any deriva-
tive work must use the same license, derivatives also must allow 
for commercial use.30
Attribution No Derivatives: An artist who chooses this license 
allows others to redistribute his or her work either commercially or 
noncommercially if the artist is given credit for his or her original 
creation. An artist under this license does not, however, allow oth-
ers to remix or alter his or her work or to create derivative works.31
Attribution Non-commercial: An artist who chooses this li-
cense allows others to distribute, remix, and create noncommercial 
derivative works from his or her work. In return, the artist seeks 
only to be given credit for his or her original creation in any  
subsequent distribution or derivative work. Noncommercial deriva-
tives do not have to be licensed under the same license as the orig-
inal work.32
                                                                                                                    
 27. See id. This ability to cherry-pick which rights are retained distinguishes Creative 
Commons from other public licensing regimes, such as open source and general public li-
censing (GPL). These licensing agreements, used mainly for software, require that both 
source code and object code be distributed to a public user. In return, it requires only that 
when a user creates a derivative work, the user also licenses the works using GPL. Essen-
tially, all open source and GPL licenses resemble Creative Commons Share-Alike licenses, 
with the key distinction being that their users are not free to choose to retain any other 
rights when choosing an open source or GPL license. See Loren, supra note 3, at 283-86; see 
also Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 390. 
 28. Creative Commons Licenses, supra note 19. 
 29. See id.
 30. See id.
 31. See id.
 32. See id.
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Attribution Non-commercial Share Alike:  An artist who 
chooses this license allows others to distribute, remix, and create 
noncommercial derivative works from his or her work. In return, 
the artist seeks not only to be given credit for his or her original 
creation, but also requires that the licensee license new creations 
under the same terms and license as the original work. Since any 
new work is required to use the same license as the original, all de-
rivatives will be noncommercial.33
Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives: An artist who 
chooses this license allows others to download and redistribute his 
or her works, but does not allow any commercial use or any altera-
tions or derivative works. The artist seeks only to be given credit 
for his or her original creation.34
 Together, these licenses form the backbone of the Creative Com-
mons regime,35 allowing artists to choose which rights are most im-
portant for them to retain while allowing the public at large to enjoy, 
share, and create works that can then spur further innovation. 
 Although Creative Commons has been criticized for lacking a co-
hesive vision because it allows artists such broad control over their 
individual licenses,36 the popularity of this regime is unquestionably 
vast. As of mid-2006, works holding Creative Commons licenses 
could be found on over 140 million web pages,37 and Creative Com-
mons announced that over 100 million different works held Creative 
Commons licenses.38 To document its global “success stories,” Crea-
tive Commons launched a Case Studies project.39 Notable users of 
Creative Commons licensing include Google, Flickr and OpenPhoto 
(online photo sharing), Magnatune (an online record label offering 
music streaming, sharing, and downloads), recording artists and 
                                                                                                                    
 33. See id.
 34. See id.
 35. Though Creative Commons attempted early on to create a wider variety of li-
censes, it has since retired some of these licenses due to inadequate demand or because 
they conflicted with the values that the Creative Commons considers important. See Crea-
tive Commons Retired Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/retiredlicenses (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2009). 
 36. See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 3, at 273 (“[T]he ambiguity of Creative Commons’ 
strategy and discourse might adversely affect artistic creation, to an extent that is surely 
not intended by the its [sic] staff and its promoters around the world.”); Elkin-Koren, supra 
note 3, at 390 (accusing the Creative Commons of suffering from “ideological fuzziness” and 
noting that although a cohesive vision could allow the movement to truly become a me-
chanism for change in the world of copyright, the broad range of licenses offered by the  
Creative Commons leaves individual creators unable to unite under a unified social or po-
litical agenda). 
 37. Loren, supra note 3, at 286-87. 
 38. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 39. Creative Commons Case Studies, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Casestudies 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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producers (such as Radiohead, Nine Inch Nails, and Vosotros Music), 
Wired Magazine, the BBC, and several prestigious academic institu-
tions (such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rice Uni-
versity, and the Berklee College of Music).40
 Professor and Creative Commons Board Member Michael Carroll 
has applauded the Creative Commons for creating a new role for in-
termediaries in the internet era.41 Carroll argues that with the boom 
of the internet, intermediaries, such as producers and distributors, 
suffered because of individuals’ ability to retrieve information and 
content on their own.42 But, according to Carroll, the Creative Com-
mons enables traditional intermediaries to redefine themselves and 
emerge with a new role for this new era.43 Libraries, for example, are 
now able to use Creative Commons software to sort and categorize 
information into easily accessible formats for themselves and their 
patrons.44 Similarly, Creative Commons licensing has spurred the 
creation of online music producers and publishers, who make their 
works immediately available to the public but still manage to turn a 
profit because of simple supply and demand economics.45 Essentially, 
small groups within traditionally wider content markets are carving 
out niches for the products that they offer because they are able to 
extend to the public better terms than traditional intermediaries, in-
cluding the added benefit of an open forum for collaboration and 
creativity. Whether these industries will continue to profit and be 
sustainable long-term is yet to be seen, but their initial success at 
least tells us that there is a growing segment of the population that 
yearns for creativity, open content, and a new way of doing business. 
III.   CREATIVE COMMONS ENFORCEMENT
 Since the Creative Commons is still a relatively new phenomenon, 
and perhaps in part because of the confusion by licensors about ex-
actly how to go about enforcing their rights under these licenses, liti-
gation regarding Creative Commons licensing is virtually nonexis-
tent.46 In the event of a breach of the terms of a license, the Creative 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. (follow “By Name” or “By Country” hyperlink for a full list of projects); see also 
Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 45, 55-59; Loren, supra note 3, at 286-87. 
 41. See Carroll, supra note 40, at 47-49. 
 42. See id. at 45. 
 43. Id. at 50-53. 
 44. See id. at 51-52. 
 45. See id. at 52-53. One such producer, Magnatune, advertises itself as extremely se-
lective about the artists it chooses, since it splits revenues with its artists on an equal ba-
sis, representing a much higher cut for the artist than with traditional music labels. Id.
at 53.
 46. There has not been a Creative Commons license litigated yet in the United States, 
and only one Creative Commons license has been litigated worldwide to date. See Curry/ 
Audax Publ’g B.V., Rechtbank Amsterdam [District Court of Amsterdam], [2006] E.C.D.R. 
2009]                          LITTLE VICTORIES 911 
Commons does not directly provide any enforcement rights to the li-
cense holder.47 In its Frequently Asked Questions, the Creative 
Commons addresses the issue of enforcement:  
Are Creative Commons licenses enforceable in a court of law? 
The Creative Commons Legal Code has been drafted with the in-
tention that it will be enforceable in court. That said, we can not 
account for every last nuance in the world’s various copyright laws 
and/or the circumstances within which our licenses are applied 
and Creative Commons-licensed content is used. 
. . . . 
What happens if someone misuses my Creative Commons-licensed 
work? 
A Creative Commons license terminates automatically if someone 
uses your work contrary to the license terms. This means that, if a 
person uses your work under a Creative Commons license and 
they, for example, fail to attribute your work in the manner you 
specified, then they no longer have the right to continue to use 
your work. This only applies in relation to the person in breach of 
the license; it does not apply generally to the other people who use 
your work under a Creative Commons license and comply with its 
terms. 
You have a number of options as to how you can enforce this; you 
can consider contacting the person and asking them to rectify the 
situation and/or you can consider consulting a lawyer to act on 
your behalf.48
These disclaimers make clear that while the Creative Commons, as 
an institution, believes that its licensing scheme should be legally en-
forceable, it is also unsure of exactly what enforcement mechanism it 
should use. 
A.   Jacobsen v. Katzer: A Taste of What’s to Come? 
American courts are only recently beginning to grapple with the 
implications of the Creative Commons movement upon copyright and 
contract law. The sole case to directly address possible enforcement of 
Creative Commons licenses is the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in 
                                                                                                                    
22 (Neth.). The Creative Commons has, however, begun to participate as amicus curiae in 
certain cases in the United States litigating licenses with similar terms. See Brief for Crea-
tive Commons as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
mgm/creative-commons.pdf; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Create Commons Corp., et al. in 
support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 
2008-1001), available at http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/ccc_brf.pdf. 
 47. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4 (“Will Creative 
Commons help me enforce my license? No. We are not permitted to provide legal advice or 
legal services to assist anyone with enforcing Creative Commons licenses. We are not a law 
firm. We’re much like a legal self-help site that offers free form-based legal documents for 
you to use however you see fit.”). 
 48. Id.
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Jacobsen v. Katzer.49 While Jacobsen did not specifically involve a 
Creative Commons license, it did involve an open source public li-
cense with terms similar to a Creative Commons license.50 Jacobsen 
managed a group that created computer programming applications 
for model train and railroad systems.51 Jacobsen licensed his inter-
face (JMRI) under an open source license, and the artistic license in-
cluded terms requiring the licensee to include the original author’s 
name, the JMRI copyright notices, references to the file which con-
tains the terms of the artistic license, an identification of the original 
source files, and a description of how the code was changed from its 
original version.52 Katzer, the manager of a company distributing a 
competing software product, used the JMRI software but failed to in-
clude any of the above requirements from the artistic license into his 
derivative software.53 Jacobsen filed suit in federal district court 
seeking an injunction based on copyright infringement since Katzer 
violated the terms of the artistic license.54
 The district court held that although Katzer had violated the 
terms of the artistic license, the license was overly broad and could 
not create liability for copyright infringement.55 In doing so, the dis-
trict court interpreted the terms of the license as covenants to a con-
tract, finding that the breach of a nonexclusive license “does not 
create liability for copyright infringement where it would not other-
wise exist.”56 This holding adopted Katzer’s argument that despite 
the violation of the license, a licensor sharing his material through 
an open source license cannot clearly prove compensable damages.57
Because the licensee and the public at large were authorized to use 
the creator’s material via a public license, failure to comply with a li-
cense term governing a nonstatutory right does not create an irre-
parable harm for the creator that can, except in the most extraordi-
nary cases, be remedied through copyright or contract enforcement.58
Since a breach of contract (unlike copyright infringement) creates no 
                                                                                                                    
 49. 535 F.3d 1373. 
 50. Id. at 1375.
 51. Id. at 1376. 
 52. Id.
 53.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 1377. 
 55. Id. at 1376-77. 
 56. Id. “The heart of the argument on appeal” was whether the license terms were, 
indeed, merely covenants to the contract or whether they were also conditions on the con-
tract. Id. at 1380. This distinction directly affects the ability of the license holder to recover 
under copyright law, where minimum statutory damages can be recovered and irreparable 
harm is presumed, or only under contract law, where the burden to show economic harm is 
on the plaintiff. See id.
 57. Id. at 1379-81. 
 58. See id. 
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presumption of irreparable harm, the district court denied Jacobsen’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.59
 Jacobsen appealed the district court’s determination that the vi-
olation of the terms of the artistic license did not create a cause of ac-
tion for copyright infringement, asking the Federal Circuit to resolve 
the question of whether a creator can dedicate his or her work, at 
least in part, to the public domain and then still enforce copyright 
rights.60 The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, re-
manding for a determination of “a likelihood of success on the merits 
and either a presumption of irreparable harm or a demonstration of 
irreparable harm; or . . . a fair chance of success on the merits and a 
clear disparity in the relative hardships and tipping in his favor.”61
 After the Federal Circuit released the Jacobsen opinion, the tech-
nology blogosphere praised the decision, announcing that the judicial 
system had finally given a definitive answer that public licensing re-
gimes are enforceable as a matter of law.62 Part of this enthusiasm 
likely stemmed from the simple fact that Jacobsen was the first case 
to specifically discuss the Creative Commons movement in a signifi-
cant way.63 The opinion discusses the popularity of the Creative 
Commons and the open source licensing movement more generally, 
as a system for collaboration between creators that leads to lower 
costs, rapid distribution of new creative works, and faster solutions 
to the problems faced by creators, specifically in the technological 
community.64 After discussing the positive social utility of public li-
censing, the court stated: 
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in 
exchange for money. The lack of money changing hands in open 
source licensing should not be presumed to mean that there is no 
economic consideration, however. There are substantial benefits, 
including economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of co-
                                                                                                                    
 59. Id. at 1377. 
 60. Id. at 1380. 
 61. Id. at 1383. 
62. See, e.g., The Josh Kagan Blog, Win for Open Source in Jacobsen v. Katzer, 
http://joshkagan.com/blog/2008/08/13/win-for-open-source-in-jacobsen-v-katzer (Aug. 13, 
2008); Zohar Efroni’s Blog, Jacobsen v. Katzer/Kamind — Federal Circuit Upholds a Free 
Software License, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5837 (Aug. 14, 2008, 07: 50); Posting of 
danese to OSI Board Blog, Jacobsen v. Katzer case decision (from Mark Radcliffe), 
http://www.opensource.org/node/360 (Aug. 13, 2008, 22:44). 
 63. However, it should be noted that Justice Breyer mentioned the Creative Com-
mons, along with a number of open content groups, while discussing the future of nonin-
fringing uses of content as technology advances in a concurring opinion. MGM Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 954 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 64. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1379. 
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pyrighted works under public licenses that range far beyond tradi-
tional license royalties.65
 The court went on to hold that “the terms of the Artistic License 
are enforceable copyright conditions.”66 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court reasoned that distributing creations under a public license 
with requirements for attribution “directly serve to drive traffic to 
the [original work] to inform downstream users of the project, which 
is a significant economic goal of the copyright holder that the law will 
enforce.”67 Specific to the software context, the court noted that such 
downstream tracking allows the original creator to access informa-
tion about how his or her work is being used and modified, allowing 
him or her to appropriately gain information derived from his or her 
own creation to build upon for future software models.68 The court al-
so noted that, as with any other public license or copyright protec-
tion, a potential user is always free to contact the copyright holder to 
negotiate alternate terms.69 Other driving factors for the court’s deci-
sion could have been Katzer’s unequivocal admission that he violated 
the terms of the license and Jacobsen’s admission that if a contract 
theory of damages was used, the calculation of actual monetary dam-
ages may be next to impossible.70 Thus, as an equitable matter, the 
court could have concluded that holding the license terms to be en-
forceable under copyright law represented the only available avenue 
for Jacobsen to recover for the wrongs against him.71
 The decision by the Federal Circuit, however, was not nearly as 
resounding a victory for the Creative Commons movement as the 
bloggers may believe. No other circuit has addressed the issue of 
whether the terms of public licenses are enforceable under copyright 
law. The Federal Circuit, in reaching its holding, relied on case law 
that found a violation of a license term to be copyright infringement 
when a licensed work was copied without authorization.72 Since there 
                                                                                                                    
 65. Id.; see also Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1200 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 66. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1383. 
 67. Id. at 1382. 
 68. Id. at 1378-79. 
 69. Id. at 1381. 
 70. See id. at 1383 n.6. 
 71. Such a conclusion in other countries could likely be enforced under a moral rights 
theory, which recognizes that a creator has not only economic—but also personal—
interests in his creation. Moral rights are legitimately recognized rights globally and are 
expressly included in the Berne Convention. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 7 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997). U.S. copyright law does not, how-
ever, recognize moral rights as a legitimate claim, id. at 159, despite being a party to the 
Berne Convention, see Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
 72. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381; see also Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21 
(2d Cir. 1976) (“[U]nauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would constitute 
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is no doubt that copying, modification, and distribution are clearly 
defined exclusive rights of the copyright holder under the Copyright 
Act,73 there is no doubt that anyone violating one of those rights is li-
able for copyright infringement. There is, however, a clear distinction 
between this category of exclusive rights, which statutes expressly 
define, and rights that a creator requests in a license, which statutes 
do not protect, such as attribution. Consequently, it remains unclear 
if any other circuits or the U.S. Supreme Court would agree that cop-
yright law can be a remedy for violations of rights that federal law 
does not expressly grant to a copyright holder.  
 If the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is correct, public license 
holders now have a limited avenue for relief. If a creator’s license 
terms are violated, regardless of whether the right violated exists in 
the copyright, he or she may pursue a copyright action. However, the 
burdens of not only providing the requisite evidentiary proof neces-
sary to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, but also the 
enormous cost of pursuing litigation in federal court, would likely 
prove too high for most individual license holders to pursue. 
 If, however, the district court’s conclusion is correct that these li-
censes are nonexclusive and therefore not eligible for copyright pro-
tection, this leaves public licensors in a legal quagmire: although the 
creator holds a valid copyright in his or her work, the copyright sta-
tute does not cover the specific requests of the license, making the 
creator ineligible to receive statutory damages. And although the li-
censee has entered into a binding legal contract with the creator, his 
or her choice to make his or her work publicly available is likely to 
mean that the creator has no way of showing what economic harm 
the failure to comply with the license has caused, since other down-
stream users continue to have the work available for use. According-
ly, under this interpretation, the creator will only be able to recover 
in the rare case where he or she can show that this licensee’s failure 
to comply with the terms of the license has caused demonstrable eco-
nomic harm to the creator or economic benefit to the licensee.  
 Similarly, while the Creative Commons license specifies that any 
violation of the terms of the license will terminate the violating licen-
see’s use of the work,74 it is unclear what relief a licensor would seek 
if the licensee did not cease his use of the work. Creative Commons 
itself does not police either the works registered under its terms or 
the users of the works, and admittedly it offers license holders no as-
sistance in pursuing violators.75 Thus, it seems that the burden is on 
                                                                                                                    
an infringement of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a work that ex-
ceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the copyright.”). 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 74. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4. 
 75. Id.
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the creators to not only stay constantly vigilant for any infringing 
uses of their works, but also to bear the legal costs of seeking injunc-
tive relief any time infringers do not terminate their use.76
B.   Curry/Audax Publishing B.V.: An International Perspective 
 American courts are not the only ones struggling with the enfor-
ceability of public licenses. In the only case across the globe to direct-
ly address a Creative Commons license, a federal district court in the 
Netherlands issued a perplexing ruling, holding that although users 
of Creative Commons licensed work are bound by the terms of the li-
cense, the burden for the licensor to prove compensable damages is 
an onerous one.77 In Curry/Audax Publishing B.V., former MTV Vee-
jay and current entrepreneur Adam Curry78 sued a Dutch tabloid 
over the unauthorized publication of several family photos licensed 
through Flickr under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial Share-Alike license.79 Though the magazine did note in 
the publication that Curry was the copyright holder for the photos, it 
did not reference the license, which was a violation of the share-alike 
term.80 Curry sought several forms of relief, including not only mone-
tary damages and litigation costs, but also consumer notification of 
the violation, a recall of the issues of the magazine in which the pic-
tures were published, and a two-page rectification statement printed 
in the magazine’s next issue.81
 Curry argued that the failure by the magazine to comply with the 
noncommercial and share-alike terms of the license made it liable for 
breach of contract, and he further claimed that as “a professional 
party on the market,” the magazine has a higher duty to ensure that 
its publications do not violate copyright or licensing terms.82 In re-
sponse, the magazine publisher argued that Curry did not suffer any 
harm from its failure to include the terms of the license with the pho-
tos and that it did not violate the noncommercial provision of the li-
cense because its primary purpose in publishing was not profit but 
for the dissemination of a news story.83 The magazine further argued 
                                                                                                                    
 76. See Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, Memorandum on Creative 
Commons Licenses, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 261, 263-69 (2006) (“If the [Creative Commons 
license] is breached, the breaching party’s license terminates, at least in theory. Whether 
this is meaningful as a practical matter, however, may be doubtful.”). 
 77. Curry/Audax Publ’g B.V., Rechtbank Amsterdam [District Court of Amsterdam], 
[2006] E.C.D.R. 22 (Neth.).  
 78. Xeni Jardin, Audience with the Podfather, WIRED, May 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2005/05/67525. 
 79. Curry/Audax Publ’g B.V., [2006] E.C.D.R. 22, at 307-08. 
 80. Id. at 309. 
 81. See id. at 308-09. Several tort claims were also involved in this suit but will not be 
discussed, as they are irrelevant to the issue of the artistic license. 
 82. See id. at 309.  
 83. Id. at 310. 
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that the license requirements were not easily found from where  
the photos were posted and its failure to comply with the license 
terms was therefore in good faith.84 The magazine finally argued that 
their previous offer to compensate Curry with 1,500 euros would 
more than compensate for any harms caused by its oversight because 
“the value of the photos is nil, since anyone can view the photos on 
the internet.”85
 Finding that the magazine was bound by the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons license, the Dutch court held that the magazine vi-
olated the license agreement by using the work for a commercial 
purpose and by failing to include a copy of the license with the pho-
tos.86 The opinion stated that as a professional actor familiar with the 
boundaries of copyrighted works, the magazine could be expected to 
do more thorough research to ensure that its publication did not vi-
olate the rights of copyright holders.87 Despite these conclusions and 
the opinion’s facial validation of the enforceability of Creative Com-
mons licenses, the magazine publishers were effectively given only a 
slap on the wrist.88 Confusing the roles of and distinctions between 
the attribution and share-alike terms of the license, the court held 
that, since the magazine did identify Curry as the copyright holder, 
Curry was not entitled to damages for the publisher’s failure to in-
clude the terms of the license with the publication.89 Likewise, the 
court determined that although the magazine violated the noncom-
mercial requirement of the license by using the photos in a publica-
tion from which they derive profit, it was not “reasonably con-
vince[ed]” that Curry suffered any material damage from the viola-
tion since the photos were available to the public at large.90 In per-
haps the most perplexing part of the opinion, the court found that it 
was not clear that the “material damage” suffered by Curry was of “a 
higher (commercial) value then [sic] [1,500 euros],” the compensation 
suggested by the magazine; however, the court did not actually re-
quire the defendants to pay this amount, or even litigation costs.91
Instead, the magazine was told that if it repeated the publication of 
                                                                                                                    
 84. Id. The website from which Audax obtained the photos contained the phrase 
“[t]his photo is public,” which the magazine publishers argued was an assurance that they 
could use the photos for publication. Id. 
 85. Id.
 86. Id. at 312. 
 87. Id. at 311. 
 88. See id. at 311-14. 
 89. Id. at 312 (“[C]laimants have correctly put forward that the disputed issue of 
Weekend lacks any reference to the Licence. However, since the words ‘Foto’s: © claimant 1’ 
have been published with the photos . . . , claimant 1 has for the present insufficiently suc-
ceeded in showing that . . . there exists any damage due to disregarding this condition.”). 
 90. Id.
 91. Id.
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these photos, it would be liable for the payment of 1,000 euros for 
every future violation; in the end Curry was awarded nothing.92
 Although the holding in this case is obviously of limited applica-
bility in the United States, because of the vast differences in interna-
tional copyright and contract laws,93 the reasoning of the Dutch court 
does illuminate possible problems in the United States for interpret-
ing Creative Commons licenses. First, the Dutch court found that the 
magazine, as an institutional actor, had more knowledge and savvy 
than a layperson about both the legal boundaries of copyright and 
the ways in which one can gain information about a protected work 
and negotiate with authors. This conclusion leads one to wonder if, in 
either the United States or abroad, courts would be less likely to hold 
unsophisticated individuals, such as the many people who on a daily 
basis download and use Creative Commons licensed work, liable for 
violating the terms of a Creative Commons license. The focus of copy-
right law is typically on the rights of the creator rather than the 
knowledge of the user, and many courts in the United States have 
found individuals to have constructive knowledge of the terms of li-
censes that they used regardless of their actual knowledge or under-
standing of those terms.94 Thus, individuals are likely to be imputed 
with knowledge of the licensing agreement if they choose to use Cre-
ative Commons works.  
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. at 314. The court additionally rejected Curry’s other requested forms of relief, 
finding that rectification and recall would represent too high a cost to compensate for the 
minimal harm caused. Id. at 313. 
 93. For example, in the United States, such a breach of the noncommercial provision 
would have automatically allowed Curry to make a copyright—rather than contract—
damages claim, which comes with a presumption of irreparable harm and the possibility of 
statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, 504 (2006); see Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. 
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that allegations of irreparable in-
jury by the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit “need not be very detailed, because 
such injury can normally be presumed when a copyright is infringed”). 
 94. Viral contracts exist “ ‘when a digital product has digital terms integrated with it, 
and the product-plus-terms propagates down a chain of distribution, with the intent that 
the terms be binding on whoever comes into possession of the package.’ ” Dusollier, supra
note 3, at 284 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A 
DEVELOPING FIELD 395, 414 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003)). This concept is also referred to 
as “contract-as-product,” since the terms and the product are bound together as a single 
unit. Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1126 (2000). Dusollier believes that the implicit nature of the contract within a Crea-
tive Commons license may be the key to ensuring that these licenses are judicially enforce-
able. Viral contracts were first used with shrink-wrap licensing for software and have sub-
sequently been adopted by both the open source and Creative Commons movements. Their 
enforceability, although by no means absolute, has been affirmed by many courts. For ex-
amples of cases both affirming and questioning the enforceability of viral contracts and on-
line licenses, see Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyber-
space, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 475 n.3 (2002); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Se-
rious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV.
687, 688 n.7 (2004). 
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 Next, the holding of Curry leads one to conclude that because the 
court did not require the magazine publisher to pay any monetary 
damages for its violations of the Creative Commons license, no Crea-
tive Commons licensed work may ever be eligible for more than mi-
nimal damages.95 The violation of the noncommercial provision in 
Curry clearly attributed to the violator’s profit in the form of maga-
zine sales, yet the court did not even attempt to calculate a possible 
percentage of profits to compensate Curry. This holding subtly en-
courages the use of Creative Commons works outside the scope of 
their licenses by clearly indicating that there will be minimal ramifi-
cations of such a violation. Even worse, this decision discourages vi-
olators from offering private settlements to license holders when they 
are contacted about their breaching activity, thereby minimizing the 
effectiveness of the license holder’s last source of relief. 
C.   Growing Concerns over Enforcement 
 Arguably, courts in neither the United States nor abroad offer 
good options to creators. Thus, it is no wonder that groups such as 
the Assocation Littéraire et Artististique Internationale (ALAI) are 
cautioning artists about the potential pitfalls of utilizing Creative 
Commons licenses for their works.96 In a memorandum to authors 
and legal professionals, the ALAI discussed the consequences of 
choosing to license one’s work under a Creative Commons license, in-
cluding the irrevocability of the licenses, the lack of compensation 
available for works under such licenses, the inability for exclusive li-
censing deals and Creative Commons licensing to coexist, and the 
lack of assistance available to authors whose licenses are violated.97
The ALAI further discussed the problems with international en-
forcement of Creative Commons licensing, not only because national 
copyright and contract laws drastically differ, but also because coun-
tries such as the United States do not recognize the enforcement of 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Although the Curry court indicated that there could be up to a 20,000 Euro fine 
for future use, the fine is not a penalty for breach of the license. See Curry/Audax Publ’g 
B.V., [2006] E.C.D.R. 22, at 314. Per the terms of use, Creative Commons licenses termi-
nate upon breach. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4. Since the 
license in Curry would have terminated upon breach, prior to the decision of the court, the 
potential future penalty discussed in the decision cannot be a penalty for breach of the li-
cense terms. Instead, the future penalty appears to be a penalty for violating the court’s 
order not to further use the licensed work, which is a judicial remedy, rather than a copy-
right or contract remedy.  
 96. This French law group focuses on protecting literary and artistic copyrights inter-
nationally and “supports technological and juridical innovations that enable authors to 
disseminate their works, to be recognized as the authors of their works and to maintain 
control over the integrity and exploitation of their works.” Association Littéraire et Artisti-
que Internationale, supra note 76, at 261. 
 97. See id. at 262-63. 
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moral rights for original works of authorship.98 Thus, the ALAI con-
cluded that although such public licenses may be perfectly acceptable 
for some creators, “given the dangers the license poses to authors’ 
prospects for control over and compensation for their works,” each 
potential licensor should proceed with the Creative Commons process 
with great caution.99
 Though there has been some academic debate about the appropri-
ate way to enforce Creative Commons licenses100 or, alternatively, to 
fix the actual Creative Commons regime so that it would minimize 
problems between licensees and licensors,101 much of the focus has 
been on assuring the public that Creative Commons licenses are suf-
ficiently reliable to use.102 The main problem with focusing on the 
problems and concerns of the public at large is that without creators 
to feed works into the commons, the system ceases to exist. Without 
works in this system for the public to utilize, the concerns over the 
rights of the public are irrelevant. Despite the pervasive idea that 
the Creative Commons will only continue to grow—and indeed even 
thrive—if the public is given increased reassurances as to the relia-
                                                                                                                    
 98. See id. at 265. The United States, in particular, appears to have the weakest en-
forcement of moral rights across the globe, which arguably stifles the creative voice of 
many creators: 
Moral rights, which protect the personal interests of all authors, safeguard the 
dignity, self-worth, and autonomy, of the author. . . . [L]acking adequate federal 
legislation to support their positions, authors attempting to enforce moral 
rights types of claims have encountered difficulty persuading the judiciary to 
vindicate their personal rights. Thus, the absence of moral rights protections il-
lustrates most powerfully the failure of our legal system to incorporate the au-
thor’s voice. 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights in the United States,
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 93, 94 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 99. Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, supra note 76, at 263. 
 100. See generally Dusollier, supra note 3; Elkin-Koren, supra note 3; Adrienne K. 
Goss, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative Commons Project, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (2007); Harrison, supra note 3; Loren, supra note 3. 
 101. Elkin-Koren suggests that although the Creative Commons has successfully in-
itiated a social movement, it has not successfully determined the specific goals and boun-
daries of the movement, leaving both licensors and users of the system with many unans-
wered questions. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 400-01 (“Creative Commons stands for open 
culture . . . . Yet, the only practice [it] persistently promotes is letting individuals govern 
their works. It does not provide much in terms of guidance or restraints on how these 
rights should be exercised.”). Elkin-Koren further suggests that letting authors control 
their own works does not allow for standardization between different types of creators,  
ultimately leading to higher information costs and arguably making the Creative Com-
mons at least as—if not more—complicated and costly as traditional copyright law. See id.
at 411-12. 
 102. Loren focuses much of her argument about enforcing the Creative Commons on 
“[e]nhancing the public’s confidence” in the reliability of this licensing regime. Loren, supra 
note 3, at 314-19. Elkin-Koren, on the other hand, focuses on the potential impact on third-
party public users of Creative Commons work. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 402-10, 416-
20; see also Goss, supra note 100, at 982-87. 
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bility of this system,103 this Comment argues that the public does not 
have any reason or incentive to distrust the system. While it is true 
that the Creative Commons was primarily created to place artists in 
control of their own works, rather than struggle under the oppres-
sively expensive and rigid rules of copyright if they desired anything 
other than default rules,104 an equally motivating factor in creating it 
was to inspire more creativity among the population at large by plac-
ing more works into the hands of the everyday artist.105 Without the 
Creative Commons, the public would once again be placed into a 
world where the complexities of copyright law, coupled with the high 
cost of negotiating any exception from the rules with the individual 
artist, serve as a total obstruction to accessing works from which to 
build their own creations. Since Creative Commons licenses are non-
revocable by the licensor absent a breach by the licensee,106 any given 
licensee need only use the licensed work in compliance with the 
terms of the license to ensure total protection by the license. Indeed, 
the only fear that licensees should currently have is that if they be-
come licensors for any derivative or independent works they may 
create, they too may be left without redress for violations of the 
terms of the license for their creative works. 
IV.   DEVELOPING NEW REMEDIES
 Before determining what the correct remedy is for licensors with 
grievances about the misuse of their Creative Commons licensed 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Loren, supra note 3, at 314-19. Dusollier, however, argues that that this was not 
an intended consequence of the Creative Commons movement; however, as a result of 
postmodern consumerism, free commodities for the public becomes the focus of any such 
system, shifting the light away from the empowerment of artists. Dusollier, supra note 3, 
at 287-88. 
 104. Because copyright rules are the default and “opting out requires an affirmative 
action,” including obtaining information, sometimes through relatively high transaction 
costs, the number of works dedicated to the public domain are minimal. Elkin-Koren, su-
pra note 3, at 382-83. In order to alter the prevailing view that copyright is the default, the 
Creative Commons has attempted to minimize the transaction costs of choosing a path 
other than traditional copyright protections. Id. at 383. 
 105. In the book that first set forth the idea of the Creative Commons, Lessig wrote 
that the digital age has given the world an opportunity like never before for everyone to 
have the ability to be creators and share their works. He believes that “[t]echnology could 
enable a whole generation to create—remixed films, new forms of music, digital art, a new 
kind of storytelling, writing, a new technology for poetry, criticism, political activism—and 
then, through the infrastructure of the Internet, share that creativity with others.” LESSIG,
supra note 3, at 9. Harrison has criticized Lessig for this view, arguing that although every 
person could, in theory, be a creator in a commons era, such widespread creation could lead 
to important artistic works being devalued. Harrison, supra note 3, at 797 (“I am not com-
fortable with allowing some of our most precious resources—the creativity of individuals—
to be simply tossed into the commons to be exploited by whomever has spare time and a 
magic marker.”). 
 106. Creative Commons Before Licensing, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/ 
Before_Licensing (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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work, we first must ask the question of whether the Creative Com-
mons is a system with enough social utility to justify the time and re-
sources necessary to create a means for enforcement. If the answer is 
yes, it is important to develop remedies that further the goals of the 
Creative Commons movement and are able to actually serve as a 
source of relief for those who seek it. 
A.   The Social Value of the Creative Commons 
 Despite the criticisms, the numbers alone107 show that a large 
segment of the population is ready for and eager to embrace a new 
alternative to the current boundaries of copyright law. The Creative 
Commons has never represented itself as an ultimate solution to the 
inherent problems with copyright law; instead, it has only committed 
itself to trying something new, in an attempt to help creators and the 
public simultaneously.108 This system empowers authors to control 
their works and encourages the public to experiment with and share 
new mediums of artistic and digital expression. The Creative Com-
mons has also had the auxiliary effect of creating new methods of 
doing business in the fields of technology and the arts.109 Ultimately, 
the goal of this movement is to overhaul the way that the world 
thinks about copyright—“to develop a new meaning of rights in crea-
tive works that does not involve exclusion, but rather sharing and 
reuse . . . [and ultimately give] a new meaning to copyright.”110 While 
the system is by no means perfect, it does represent a welcomed de-
parture and a new way of thinking that, with some modifications, 
could ultimately reach the goals it espouses and reshape copyright 
law as we know it. 
 So, if as a matter of policy, the global community of creators de-
sires the continuation of the Creative Commons, the legal system 
must now catch up to the pace of this growing phenomenon and in-
itiate a method by which licensors may enforce violations of their li-
censes. Since litigation over these types of public licenses has only 
recently begun, however,111 the debate over how they should be en-
forced is still guided mostly by scholarly writing. The argument, ab-
ridged, is that copyright law as it stands is a proprietary regime, 
                                                                                                                    
 107. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
 108. Unlike most social movements, which hope to have an immediate impact on the 
legal system, Lessig’s vision for the trajectory of the Creative Commons is to first effect so-
cial change “in the streets,” leading to a new mentality about the way copyright can best 
work. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 275 (2004). He then hopes that 
the legal boundaries of copyright law will play catch-up to the social revolution he inspired. 
See id. at 257-305. 
 109. See generally Carroll, supra note 40. 
 110. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 395. 
 111. See Part III.A-B (discussing Jacobsen v. Katzer and Curry/Audax Publishing B.V.). 
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notwithstanding the intangible nature of intellectual property. De-
spite the lack of physical barriers, the increasing commoditization of 
copyrightable works has changed the general population’s viewpoint 
to one where such intangible works represents a legal line in the 
sand: do not infringe, or else.112 And, although the traditional frame-
work of property law does not translate well into the field of intellec-
tual property since creative works are capable of infinite consump-
tion,113 shifting the focus from copyright boundaries to license restric-
tions as the primary means by which to assert one’s rights in intel-
lectual property ultimately means only that the “new” way of doing 
business serves to exacerbate the view of creativity as a commodity.114
 Several scholars have discussed the competing but sometimes in-
extricably intertwined roles of property and contract rights in deter-
mining an appropriate method for enforcing these terms of Creative 
Commons licenses.115 “Private ordering” is the term for legally defin-
ing the boundaries for public use of private goods. Essentially, pri-
vate ordering systems, like the Creative Commons, attempt to con-
tractually define public action while retaining claims upon property 
rights.116 Under this interpretation, the license that defines the scope 
of the rights is said to only have force because of the underlying cop-
yright in the licensed work.117 It is a chicken-or-the-egg mentality: 
the contract is only possible because of the underlying copyright, but 
the force of the copyright protections is diminished as soon as the li-
cense is created. Private ordering is, however, only a necessary lens 
through which to look at the Creative Commons if the terms of the li-
cense are viewed as a whole—that is, a licensee either complies with 
the terms of the license or it does not. A more suitable method for 
viewing the terms of a Creative Commons is to ask whether or not 
each individual term of the license has been satisfied. 
 Essentially, there are four terms possible in any Creative Com-
mons license: Non-commercial, No Derivatives, Attribution, and 
Share-Alike.118 The first two represent exclusive rights granted to a 
creator by statute; thus, including these license terms is almost re-
dundant of the rights inherent in the underlying copyright, and any 
                                                                                                                    
 112. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 398-99. 
 113. Id. at 399 (“Property rules do not merely define rights and duties. They further 
carry a normative message, announcing which values deserve protection and how. There-
fore, reliance on property rights in creative works is likely to reinforce the belief that shar-
ing these works is always prohibited unless authorized.”).  
 114. Id. at 400. 
 115. See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 3; Elkin-Koren, supra note 3; Loren, supra note 3. 
 116. See Dusollier, supra note 3, at 282-83. 
 117. See id. at 283 (arguing that since the Creative Commons was created to eliminate 
rigid boundaries rather than create new ones, using contractual terms to define the scope 
of a creator’s rights is self-defeating). 
 118. See Creative Commons Licenses, supra note 19. 
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violation of one or both of those terms clearly allows the licensor to 
bring a claim of copyright infringement.119 The statutorily protected 
rights come with a presumption of irreparable harm as a result of the 
inherent economic nature and assumed commercial value of the work 
to society.120
 The same cannot be said of Attribution and Share-Alike terms, 
however. These “rights” are not protected by copyright law, arguably 
because the law does not deem them sufficiently important to the 
economic and social goals that copyright purports to advance. De-
spite the secondary role of economic rights, the digital age is making 
it increasingly clear that economic rights can manifest themselves in 
a number of new ways.121 A new artist trying to make a name for 
himself may choose to license his first songs with a Creative Com-
mons license in order to develop a reputation in the internet commu-
nity. Photographers may license photos under Creative Commons li-
censes in order to attract sponsors for their weblog. These fledgling 
artists are the most common users of Creative Commons licenses, 
and though the social value of their work may not be considered par-
ticularly high, the Creative Commons Attribution license term gives 
them the hope that one day it might be. 
 Although it is still unclear exactly what, if any, economic benefit 
derives from Share-Alike licensing, the social benefit is obvious: if 
artists require that other artists using or sharing their works distri-
bute the new works by the same license terms, the artists ensure 
that the commons continues to grow for their own use. Though some 
have suggested that the Share-Alike licensing prevalent in public li-
censing is a benevolent system where participants are simply more 
generous and prone to sharing,122 the more cynical, and more likely, 
view is that artists are simply trying to ensure that the next time 
they turn to the commons for a source of inspiration, they will have 
new works to utilize. This constant reenergizing of the public  
                                                                                                                    
 119. See Loren, supra note 3, at 284-85. 
 120. See James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 10-12 (2007) (“[T]he definition of the ‘innovation’ that we commit ourselves to 
promoting has itself been a surprisingly reductionist one—apparently consisting of that 
package of potential future goods, technologies, culture, and inventions it is reasonable to 
believe that current market participants would value the most . . . .”). 
 121. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing down-
stream economic benefits of public licensing); see also Dusollier, supra note 3, at 281 
(“Th[e] ethos of sharing suggests that the economic model put in place by the Creative 
Commons licenses is one of gratuity. . . . But other benefits resulting from the release of a 
work under Creative Commons licenses might also incentivize creation. . . . Distributing 
works for free might provide artists with new opportunities, such as funding, production 
contracts or paid contracts to work on other projects.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 383 (“[The Creative Commons scheme] as-
sumes that people want to share their work on generous terms. It further assumes people 
want to share the power to reuse, modify, and distribute their works to others. The goal is 
to help people express this preference for sharing . . . .”). 
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domain, while surely not creating only works that we deem to  
have high social value,123 does ultimately serve the goal stated in  
the U.S. Constitution of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”124
B.   Two Possible Methods for Enforcement 
 For the Creative Commons regime to continue to grow and thrive, 
licensors must have a method of enforcing these license terms. There 
are two logical ways to enforce Creative Commons licenses that 
would minimize the costs for licensors, retain trust in the system by 
licensees, and leave the world of copyright as we know it wholly in-
tact. The first solution proposed by this Comment is to consider each 
individual term of the license separately, allowing licensors to assert 
copyright claims in those statutorily granted rights, while retaining a 
contract claim for any failure to abide by Attribution or Share-Alike 
terms. Such an interpretation would make Attribution and Share-
Alike terms enforceable under concepts of equity, such as unjust 
enrichment. Essentially, licensors choosing these license terms to 
protect their work expect at least trickle-down recognition, arguably 
leading to future economic benefit; any failure to properly attribute 
the licensor might therefore result in the licensee subverting the li-
censor’s future profits in other endeavors. While damages for such 
hypotheticals could, quite obviously, rarely be proven, allowing the 
licensor to seek an injunction or request specific performance of the 
license term125 could at a minimum erase the harm already done and 
put the licensor back in the position he or she would have been in be-
fore the breach.  
 It is clear that, currently, a licensor can request these same steps 
from the violating user. However, there are no observable legal rami-
fications, and thus violators have little incentive to cooperate and 
will likely ignore the licensor’s pleas. Therefore, this Comment also 
advocates that courts award to licensors reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs of their enforcement efforts to those licensors forced to seek 
such equitable relief in court. If such costs were obligatory for the 
breaching party, the costs may deter future violators from infringe-
                                                                                                                    
 123. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 796 (“[T]he creative commons are littered with all 
manner of trash . . . . They resemble the landscape from a ‘Mad Max’ film far more than a 
national park. Old scripts from ‘Three’s Company’ will eventually find a place in these 
commons, perhaps next to Anna Karenina.”).  
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 125. The best way to ensure the feasibility of specific performance of the license terms 
would be for the Creative Commons to modify the language of the licenses to include a re-
quirement for specific performance of Attribution and Share-Alike terms. Whether the 
Creative Commons would be willing to modify the license terms and step into the ring to 
help in the fight for enforcement is yet to be seen. 
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ment or, at the very least, make such individuals more willing to 
cooperate with the licensor’s requests for acquiescence. 
 It may be important to note that the open source movement has 
gone the opposite direction in its search for validity, asking that its 
terms be interpreted only as licenses and never as contractual provi-
sions, so that the sole avenue for relief is via copyright. There are 
several key distinctions between the two regimes, however, that 
make identical enforcement regimes impractical. First, in the open 
source world, there is only one choice for a licensor to make: whether 
to use such a license in the first place. There is no picking and choos-
ing of desired terms, such as in the Creative Commons. Logically, it 
is significantly easier to define a single method for enforcement when 
the licensing regime is one-size-fits-all. Second, the open source and 
GPL movements were born from—and are based in—the technology 
and software industries. Not only do these industries have clearly de-
fined industry standards for their products and means of business, 
but they also have a much stronger coalition to negotiate and lobby 
for desired outcomes. Artists, on the other hand, are composed of a 
variety of different groups with competing goals: photographers, mu-
sicians, painters, sculptors, novelists, and play-writers do not share 
common goals or desires, nor do they have the same kind of political 
influence as the technology industry. It follows that such a varied 
group needs a licensing scheme that meets a variety of needs, rather 
than having a uniform approach. 
 Lastly, the goals of the users of these two licensing regimes are, in 
most cases, vastly different, and the same remedy would therefore 
not achieve the respective goals of each. GPL and open source de-
vised the share-alike licensing regime to ensure that software devel-
opers could track the changes to their work and collaborate with each 
other to resolve bugs and problems more expediently and, ultimately, 
each benefit more from being a part of a fast paced and profitable in-
dustry. Artists using the Creative Commons license, however, have 
no such immediacy in their collaborative process, and the relation-
ship between the licensor and licensee is much more unilateral. 
While everyone benefits from contributions of additional works to the 
commons, ultimately, each individual is pursuing his or her own ar-
tistic goal, whether profitable or not. The distinctions between these 
two movements are significant enough to warrant vastly differing en-
forcement regimes, despite their similarities and connections. 
 Alternately, Creative Commons licensing terms could be enforced 
via a third party arbitration and mediation network. Although such a 
group would likely be targeted at interpreting and enforcing nonsta-
tutory rights asserted in the Creative Commons licenses, it is possi-
ble that licensors could choose dispute resolution as an alternative to 
costly copyright infringement litigation for Non-commercial and No 
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Derivative terms as well.126 Although the Creative Commons has be-
come an international phenomenon, it is in truth just an easy way to 
obtain information, sets of forms, and software with which to license 
one’s work. There is no reason that a similar system could not be 
created that contains a mechanism for enforcement or includes in the 
license a requirement of arbitration to resolve disputes. 
 If a third party group, or the Creative Commons itself, could find 
a way to support a revenue stream, while still making the arbitration 
services affordable enough for the average licensor, arbitration pa-
nels could be established to create norms and precedent for this 
burgeoning community.127 If such an organization was successfully 
created, it is possible that not only national but also global standards 
could be established for public licensing. With definitive standards in 
place, both licensors and licensees alike could be more confident that 
their works and uses were being properly used, and if terms were vi-
olated, they would be assured that they would have an affordable 
avenue for relief. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 Copyright law as we know it is not going to die, because ultimate-
ly the United States, as well as the international community, needs 
and wants copyright law as a means to protect the original works of 
authors and promote progress in the fields of art, science, and tech-
nology. But to return to the original goals of copyright law, there must 
be an increase in collaboration between creators and a new focus on 
flexibility to define the scope of one’s rights. Essentially, in order to 
meet the goals that copyright law seeks to achieve, there must be a 
way to assure creators that joining in collaborative efforts within the 
creative community does not leave them in a no-win situation. 
                                                                                                                    
 126. Arbitration panels would, for example, be the ideal place to resolve disputes over 
what a noncommercial use is, since these groups are capable of employing arbiters with 
expertise in the matters that those in the court system may not have. See Goss, supra note 
100, at 982-83. 
 127. This type of alternative dispute resolution is becoming more popular with the rise 
of the internet; it has been a particularly successful mechanism internationally in the area 
of domain name disputes. See WIPO Domain Name Dispute Resolution Statistics, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (providing an-
nual statistics on the number of domain name disputes resolved by WIPO arbitration since 
1999, along with additional statistics regarding the use of WIPO arbitration by country of 
use). In the United States, arbitration is required for domain name disputes by the De-
partment of Commerce. National Arbitration Forum: FORUM Domain Name Dispute Res-
olution, http://domains.adrforum.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). And, although arbitra-
tion over international domain name disputes is not required as in the United States, it is 
an alternative remedy available through the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/index.html (last vi-
sited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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 The birth of the Creative Commons represents the first step in 
this movement; the next step is to find effective ways to enforce each 
and every Creative Commons license term if it is violated. Although 
copyright law may be the appropriate means with which to enforce 
commercial and derivative terms of Creative Commons licenses, it is 
not the appropriate solution to all of the possible enforcement ques-
tions that the Creative Commons regime raises. Attribution and 
Share-Alike licensing rights are the heart and soul of this new 
movement in copyright law, representing a definitive shift among 
creators to share their works so long as they receive appropriate cre-
dit and the licensees of their work ensure the continued growth of the 
commons. Enforcing violations of these license terms under contract 
law theories, like unjust enrichment and specific performance, is a 
more appropriate remedy and will allow more creators to pursue 
their legal rights to control access to their works. An alternative, but 
equally effective, solution would be for the Creative Commons itself 
(or some other private group) to create a network dedicated to arbi-
tration and mediation of Creative Commons license terms. 
 The questions to ask when crafting any legal remedy for Attribu-
tion and Share-Alike license terms should be simple ones: who will 
be using this system, what are the users’ goals, and what remedy 
serves that end? Ultimately, large institutional creators are unlikely 
to use this type of licensing at all, and the institutions that do use 
this type of licensing have made a conscious and informed choice to 
commit their resources toward the progressive goal of this move-
ment. The licensors under this system are much more likely to be in-
dividual artists who are focusing on making a name for themselves 
or contributing to the broader goals of growing the Creative Com-
mons movement. Those creators who are most mindful of profits and 
litigation are quite unlikely to use this system at all. 
 Instead of focusing on profits and pecuniary goals, the artists us-
ing these licenses only want and need the rights they originally 
asked for and to be in the position they would have been had the li-
censee complied with the agreed upon terms.128 Along those lines, in-
dependent artists are unlikely to be able to pursue costly copyright 
litigation in federal court. If federal court is the only avenue availa-
ble for enforcing Creative Commons licenses, a segment of the popu-
lation with legitimate claims for their work will likely be unable to 
                                                                                                                    
 128. It may be true that Creative Commons licensors do not expect much at all. Re-
cently, a web developer who had licensed a photo under a Creative Commons Attribution 
license was contacted by a movie studio planning to use his photo for movie promotions for 
“Iron Man.” When the studio explained the high cost of attributing him for the photo in the 
credits, the man signed a release without even accepting the studio’s offer of monetary 
compensation. Post of Fred Benenson to Creative Commons Weblog, Iron Man and the 
Right Not to Be Attributed, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/11118 (Feb. 2, 2008). 
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recover. Using contract law and equitable remedies as the relief for 
violations of these license terms ensures that the remedy is one that 
the average licensor will actually be able to seek.129
 As a matter of policy, if the Creative Commons reaches a large 
segment of the population that is thirsty for a change in the way we 
look at copyrighted works, we must find a way to protect the system. 
Protecting the system in this instance means protecting each creator 
from infringing behavior, costly litigation, and the distinct possibility 
of hollow moral victories.130 Instead, we must at least allow creators 
the possibility of success in the form of injunctions, binding arbitra-
tion, and the recovery of enforcement costs. In the end, these little 
victories could be the pivotal difference in the success of this social 
movement. 
                                                                                                                    
 129. This is not to say that large institutional users of the Creative Commons would 
not also be able to seek equitable relief. However, since the Creative Commons has become 
such a sweeping international phenomenon, the remedy should be structured so that it is 
accessible to the average user. 
 130. The holding of Curry/Audax Publishing B.V. was one such victory. Though the 
court upheld the license and found the licensee in breach of its terms, the licensor was not 
granted a remedy, monetary or otherwise. See Curry/Audax Publ’g B.V., Rechtbank Ams-
terdam [District Court of Amsterdam], [2006] E.C.D.R. 22, at 311-14. 
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